Work VPN Should Not Steal House Traffic

By Zach

The work laptop joins the house, and suddenly printers, Home Assistant, and the IoT VLAN are “on the corporate network” — or the laptop cannot see anything at home except the work VPN. A work client does not belong in Trusted. Full-tunnel plus someone else’s DNS will steal the house.

Symptom

Plug in (or wake) the work machine on the home Wi-Fi. One of these shows up:

  • Home hostnames die; every lookup goes to corporate DNS.
  • The default route points at the work tunnel, so 192.168.XXX.0/24 is slow, black-holed, or hairpinned through a data center.
  • The work OS can now ping cameras, a NAS, or HA on the home LAN — traffic that should never leave the Work zone.
  • Your personal remote-access VPN fights the work client; only one of them “wins.” That fight is a cousin of VPN Connected, but Nothing on the IoT VLAN Answers.

Why it happens

Work VPN clients are doing what they were licensed to do: send your traffic to their network. If the laptop sits on Trusted, it already has a LAN path to IoT and Security. If the client then installs a full-tunnel default route or a DNS suffix that covers everything, the house is no longer yours for the length of the session.

This is not a vendor-specific trick. The product name on the work client does not matter. Treat the machine as hostile-adjacent: a managed endpoint that must not be on the same zone as phones, HA, or cameras.

Fix steps

  1. Put work on its own VLAN and zone. SSID or wired port → Work network object. Not Trusted, not IoT, not Security. Guest is the wrong label too; you want a zone you can write policy against without kicking visitors.

  2. Block Work ↔ Trusted / IoT / Security except the one or two exceptions you can name (for example, a printer object, or a jump host you deliberately share). There should be no path from Work to HA, cameras, or the NAS. The same default-deny discipline as Default-Deny on the IoT VLAN applies here — write the exception, document it, do not “temporarily” allow any.

  3. Split-tunnel the work client to corporate subnets only, if you are allowed to. The home default route and home DNS must stay on the house. If the employer forces full-tunnel, you cannot fix that in UniFi — you can only contain the laptop in the Work zone so the tunnel has nothing of yours to steal.

  4. Watch DNS and the default route every time the client connects. On the work OS, check whether the default route moved and whether DNS is now a corporate resolver. On the home router, confirm Work cannot recurse to your internal names. A full-tunnel that “only” steals DNS will still break HA and printers by name while ping-by-IP looks fine.

  5. Do not dual-home the machine on Trusted “when the VPN is off.” The VPN client will come back. Keep the NIC on Work. Use a personal device on Trusted for the house.

How to verify

  • Work laptop associated to the Work SSID. It reaches the employer resources it is supposed to reach.
  • From that laptop, ping to 192.168.XXX.XXX (HA) and to an IoT address fails unless you documented an exception.
  • From a Trusted phone, the house still works while the work VPN is up — your default route did not move.
  • Corporate DNS is not answering queries for home names from Trusted devices.
  • Packet rules show deny between Work and IoT/Security in both directions.